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Measuring the Effects 





Amherst College and Mathematica Policy Research
This chapter examines existing research on the relationship
between short-time compensation (STC) use and patterns of labor mar-
ket adjustment by firms.  We note that the research often fails to model
the actual choices available to firms and their workers in which both
reductions in compensated hours and layoffs are feasible.  We show
that the strategies used previously to calculate the extent to which time
on STC affects time on layoff have yielded a wide range of estimates.
We also explore new data from a recently completed evaluation of STC
programs in the United States.  These data confirm the need to study
labor force adjustment strategies along multiple dimensions, but they
also illustrate the difficulties involved in assessing the precise impact
of STC use on workforce adjustment.
North American employers—particularly those in the United
States—have often been alleged to prefer layoffs to hours reductions
when responding to output or cost shocks (Burdett and Wright 1989;
Feldstein 1976, 1978).  Feldstein, for example, highlighted two fea-
tures of the U.S. system that encouraged firms to opt for layoffs during
cyclical downturns: 1) unemployment insurance (UI) benefits were, at
that time, nontaxable to workers who received them, and 2) the UI pay-
roll tax was not fully “experience rated” so that firms did not incur the
full costs of benefits paid to their workers.  According to Feldstein,
these features created a strong incentive for firms to use layoffs to
reduce the workforce.  The author’s empirical estimates, together with
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subsequent estimates by others (for example, Topel 1983), tended to
support the notion that layoffs, especially temporary ones, were corre-
lated with the level of the “layoff subsidy” the UI system provided.
In an effort to identify other ways in which the U.S. system of
unemployment compensation may encourage layoffs, several other
authors have focused on the way the UI systems treat hours reductions.
In many European countries, workers who are placed on reduced hours
are eligible for a prorated share of their unemployment benefits.  Until
recently, however, the availability of such STC was severely limited in
both the United States and Canada. 
In this chapter, we critically examine the methods that have been
used to assess the effects of STC on total workforce reductions. We
begin by briefly discussing the existing theoretical approaches to this
topic.  We then describe a number of previous attempts to develop
empirical evidence on conversions between STC and layoffs.  We
devote considerable attention to evaluating methodologies that have
been used for this purpose, because they have yielded widely differing
results.  In the next section, we present some new empirical evidence
on the relationship between STC use and layoffs from our recently
completed evaluation of STC programs in the United States.  This
research further confirms the importance of this relationship and illus-
trates the difficulties in measuring it precisely.   Finally, in the last sec-
tion, we offer some general conclusions about our state of knowledge
on the ability of STC-type programs to influence firms’ workforce
adjustment patterns.
THEORETICAL MODELING
To understand how employers’ and workers’ preferences interact
when labor input is reduced during periods of changing demand, the
development of an employment contract model is required.  The
approach usually taken in the literature draws on the early implicit con-
tracts model developed by Azariadis (1975).  This model views work-
ers and employers as engaged in a bilateral bargaining process.  An
efficient outcome from the process is a set of choices that maximizes
each party’s well-being (that is, profits for firms and utility for work-
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ers), given the choice of the other party.  In its most general form, this
model predicts that risk-averse workers will generally prefer hours
reductions to layoffs during economic downturns.  This preference can
be altered by technical aspects of a firm’s production and cost func-
tions.  For example, if the firm’s adjustment costs are asymmetric with
respect to changes in hours and employment, different patterns may be
optimal.  High fringe benefit costs, especially those that are “quasi-
fixed,” may deter downward adjustments in hours.  On the other hand,
hiring costs, such as those related to the search for workers or to train-
ing and acquiring job-specific human capital, may deter layoffs.
Choices may also be affected by imperfect substitutability between
hours and employment in the production process.
A few theoretical papers (Wright and Hotchkiss 1988; Burdett and
Wright 1989; Jehle and Lieberman 1992) have attempted to explore
how the availability of various UI and STC options may affect hours–
employment choices.  Under a stylized “American” system, UI benefits
are assumed to be payable only if the worker is fully separated from the
firm.  Alternatively, a stylized “European” system of compensation is
assumed to provide benefits only for reductions in normal working
hours.  Models adopting this approach suggest, not surprisingly, that
the American system encourages firms to opt for layoffs during down-
turns in demand, whereas firms operating under a European system,
ceteris paribus, favor shortened workweeks.  In both cases, the work
reduction incentives derive primarily from the incomplete experience
rating of UI benefit payments.  Hence, some authors favor a move
toward more complete experience rating as the primary way to amelio-
rate inefficient labor input choices encouraged by UI benefits (see, for
example, Burdett and Wright 1989).
The all-or-nothing nature of the stylized UI systems in the theoreti-
cal literature makes it difficult to apply these models directly to actual
data.  In Europe, the bulk of UI benefits goes to workers who are fully
laid off rather than on reduced hours, and in North America, Canada
has a national STC program, as do 18 U.S. states.1  Furthermore, most
examinations of firms’ adjustment patterns on the microeconomic
level, especially in North America, have found that individual firms use
both layoffs and work-week reductions to reduce labor utilization (Ker-
achsky et al. 1986; Employment and Immigration Canada [EIC]1993).
Hence, a clear first step in the development of theoretical models that
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can be estimated from real world data is to generalize the nature of
adjustment options faced by the firm.
Adapting these theoretical models to allow UI eligibility for both
hours reductions and layoffs seems straightforward, although the pub-
lished literature has not attempted this adaptation in its full generality.
Presumably, such a generalized model would predict that both types of
reductions would be encouraged by the availability of benefits, with
firms choosing the type of reduction or combination of reductions on
the basis of their own cost and productivity considerations.
Differences in the generosity of benefits available under the two
unemployment options could also affect observed workforce adjust-
ments, a point made forcefully in the recent paper by Van Audenrode
(1994).  Indeed, the increased flexibility of a system that compensates
both hours reductions and layoffs might encourage additional compen-
sated unemployment, relative to a system that provides UI eligibility
for only one type of workforce reduction.
Aggregate studies of U.S. labor market dynamics over the business
cycle provide evidence on this issue.  These studies suggest that labor
hoarding may have accounted for between 4 and 9 percent of total
employment during downturns in demand, probably because of high
adjustment costs associated with layoffs (Hamermesh 1993, p. 185).
Some portion of this excess labor would probably find compensated
hours reductions attractive after STC becomes available.2  The extent
of these incentives depends on variations in fringe benefit costs avail-
able from hours reductions and the degree to which STC benefits are
effectively experience rated, among other things.  Much of the existing
empirical research on STC has not, however, addressed the increasing
flexibility suggested by theoretical predictions.
EMPIRICAL STUDIES MEASURING THE EFFECT
OF STC USE ON WORKFORCE DYNAMICS
Because one of the primary goals of STC is to reduce the number
of laid-off workers, most previous researchers have tried to estimate
differences in the dynamics of workforce reductions that result from
STC usage.  Although many different approaches have been taken to
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analyzing such reductions, we summarize these approaches in what we
call the “layoff conversion rate.”  This measure reflects the degree to
which unemployment compensation under an STC-type program sub-
stitutes for unemployment compensation under a regular UI program.3
A conversion rate of 1.0 (a value frequently assumed in the literature)
implies perfect substitution: each hour of STC substitutes for precisely
an hour of layoff.  Layoff conversion rates greater than 1.0 imply that
the compensated unemployment from layoffs avoided because of STC
exceeds the compensated unemployment from STC itself. Conversion
rates less than 1.0 imply that firms had greater total workforce reduc-
tions with STC than they would have if STC had been unavailable.
In reviewing previous research, we focus narrowly on ways in
which conversion rates have been treated.  Many of the studies we dis-
cuss here have contributed significantly to an understanding of the
other important issues such as 1) the effects of STC on employer and
employee satisfaction, achievement of affirmative action goals, and
worker productivity; 2) the effects of program legislation and adminis-
tration on STC participation rates; 3) the relative costs and benefits of
STC usage to employees, firms, the UI trust fund, and society; 4) sea-
sonal, cyclical, and repeat use of STC; and 5) the use of STC by firms
undergoing structural change.  We do not summarize research on these
issues here, however.4  Rather, we concentrate solely on the methodol-
ogy researchers have used to examine layoff conversion rates.  Hence,
we are not attempting to explore the full social costs and benefits of
STC compared to layoffs.  For many issues involving STC desirability,
however, estimates of the layoff conversion rate play an important,
even central, role.  For example, measuring any potential social benefit
from STC use requires some way of estimating how many layoffs
would have occurred in the absence of the program so that the analysis
can be conducted on a “per layoff equivalent” basis.  Much of the prior
research on STC has not been especially careful in adopting such a
consistent basis.  Our research focus on measurement of workforce
dynamics therefore serves to highlight a primary source of the differ-
ences in conclusions from previous research.
Experimental studies to determine the layoff conversion rate have
not been feasible, so researchers have typically used one of three non-
experimental approaches to estimate the workforce reduction that
would have occurred if firms had not used STC: self-reporting, the
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explicit or implicit assumption that the conversion rate is precisely 1.0,
and estimation using matched samples of firms that did and did not use
STC during some period.  In the next three subsections, we discuss
these approaches and some of the research based on them.  For ease of
comparison among the studies, those that we shall discuss are briefly
summarized in Table 1.
Studies Based on Self-Reporting
One way of estimating the number of layoffs avoided because of
STC usage is based on firms’ self-reports.  This method uses two main
data sources: firms’ plan applications and surveys of employers.  When
a firm applies for an STC plan approval, it typically has to specify the





New York Department 
of Labor (1994)
New York STC Firms Self-reporting >1
Best (1988) Canadian and California 
STC firms, administrative 
data, and simulations
Self-reporting 1.0








Van Audenrode (1994) Five European countries, 
aggregate employment data
NAa NA








Canada, worksharing and 










Five states Comparison 
matching
See text
a NA = not applicable.
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number of layoffs that its use of the plan would avoid.  Because a firm
needs administrative approval for its STC plan to become effective, it
may have an incentive to overstate the number of layoffs that would
occur if its STC plan is not approved.  The validity of this counterfac-
tual cannot be tested directly.5  EIC (1993, pp. 58–59) found that firms
typically overstate their planned workforce reductions; that is, the
actual reduction is less than the planned reduction.  This study also
found that a significant number of post-STC layoffs occurred.  These
factors suggest that using firms’ self-reported statements on the num-
ber of layoffs that will be averted if an STC plan is approved overesti-
mates the effects of STC on layoffs.  EIC (1984, pp. 116–118) found
that retrospective interview responses on layoffs that would have
occurred had STC not been available were 23 percent lower than firms’
self-reports of planned layoffs from STC plan applications.
A second source of self-reported information on averted layoffs is
survey data from firms that have used STC, such as those reported in
EIC (1984).  These data may suffer from the same problem as self-
reported data on STC plan application forms—firms are asked to
hypothesize about how many employees they would have laid off had
STC been unavailable.  A firm might never have laid off any employees
(as the “labor-hoarding” literature suggests), and it might also have laid
off significantly fewer or more full-time employees than the full-time
equivalent (FTE) value of the STC reduction implemented.
Most states with STC legislation have not conducted explicit stud-
ies to estimate the number of layoffs averted by STC usage.  Their
research interest has focused on other aspects of  the STC adoption and
financing processes.  The New York Department of Labor, however,
has estimated the number of layoffs averted in each year since 1988. In
1994, for example, 445 New York firms had a total of 9,284 employees
on STC plans, which paid out $3.6 million in benefits.  These firms
reported that, because of STC use, almost 4,000 layoffs were averted.
Using average benefit levels and unemployment durations for laid-off
workers, the state estimated that about $10.8 million was saved in UI
benefits in 1994 alone.  If we assume perfect experience rating, these
results suggest that, on average, firms saved three dollars in potential
UI taxes for every dollar paid out in taxes to support STC benefits.  At
face value, this calculation seems implausible and is inconsistent with
the low observed utilization rates for STC in New York and elsewhere.
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As we shall see, the result  also conflicts with most other empirical evi-
dence on STC.
Studies Assuming a Conversion Rate of 1.0 
A second way to estimate the number of layoffs avoided because of
STC usage is based on calculating the FTE workforce reduction
directly from administrative records (or survey data) on the number of
employees collecting STC and their workweek percentage reductions
using an assumed conversion rate of 1.0.  For example, if a firm has 10
employees on a 40 percent workweek reduction for five weeks, the
researcher assumes that the STC plan averted four layoffs, each of a
five-week duration.
It is important to recognize that several assumptions are inherent in
the “one-for-one” conversion rate assumed in this type of estimation.
Most important, the calculation assumes a linearity that often does not
exist in either production technologies or employment policies.  In
standard economic theory, the firm maximizes profits by adjusting
labor and other inputs.  Because STC may change many factors in the
profit function—such as productivity, labor costs, and logistical con-
straints—it is unlikely that firms would choose the same person-hours
of labor input under both shortened workweeks and full-time layoffs.
Assuming a one-for-one conversion rate suggests that firms are not
responsive to the theoretical advantages and disadvantages the
researcher is trying to estimate (or that the advantages and disadvan-
tages cancel each other out).  In many situations, however, researchers
assume a one-for-one conversion rate primarily because data limita-
tions prevent estimation of the rate directly.
For example, Best (1988) uses a variety of data at the firm level to
conduct a comprehensive and innovative evaluation of California’s
STC program and the old Canadian program.  This study presents a
good discussion of the factors that can affect the layoff conversion rate,
such as firms’ ability to resume production more quickly after a down-
turn if STC is used, laid-off workers’ tendencies to leave unemploy-
ment for new jobs, and workers’ tendencies to oppose STC less than
layoffs.  Because he had no administrative data on nonparticipating
employers, Best relied heavily on employer and employee survey data
and simulations to derive his estimates.  Although he presented infor-
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mation on employers’ and employees’ perceptions of the work loss
from STC relative to work loss under layoffs, he suggested that these
data may be invalid because of inconsistencies between the perceptions
of the two groups within firms (p. 76).  He concluded that using a one-
for-one conversion rate is the most reasonable approach because the
data on actual conversion rates are mixed, and these rates may vary sig-
nificantly over time and by other factors unique to an individual firm. 
Best also simulated different estimates of the cost of STC relative
to the cost of layoffs for the UI system (including both benefits paid
and administrative costs).  These estimates, ranging from 1.2 to 3.7,
depend on the duration of work-sharing plans, the magnitude of the
workweek reduction, and the percentage of STC participants laid off
after STC.6  Best acknowledged that most of the scenarios he presents
are uncommon, and it appears that the simulation closest to the average
workweek reduction, average duration of the reduction, and average
post-STC layoffs provides a ratio of the cost of STC to the costs of
equivalent layoffs for the UI system of around 1.6.  Because this esti-
mate is based on an underlying assumed conversion rate of 1.0, the
extra costs from STC arise from such factors as the higher weekly UI
benefits of STC recipients, differential treatment of the waiting week
under the two programs, and the additional administrative costs of
STC.  The result shows that there can be a considerable difference
between conversion rate estimates based on equivalent hours of layoff
and estimates based on costs to the UI system.
Studies based on aggregate data have tended to use an assumed
conversion rate of 1.0 when attempting to estimate the impact of STC
usage.7  This is especially true for studies that have sought to evaluate
STC in the European context.  For example, Vroman (1992) used
administrative data on STC usage in Germany to estimate what
employment would have been in the absence of the program during the
period 1970 to 1991.  To make that calculation, he simply subtracted
“full-time equivalent layoffs” experienced by workers on STC from
actual employment data, thereby implicitly assuming a conversion rate
of 1.0.  He found that the cyclical behavior of his adjusted employment
series has a closer relationship to the cyclical behavior of U.S. employ-
ment than the unadjusted series.  Hence, Vroman concluded that the
greater availability of STC is an important reason for observed Euro-
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pean/American differences.  The author presents no empirical evidence
to support his conversion rate assumption.
The study by Abraham and Houseman (1994) examined the ways
in which job security regulations in Belgium, France, and Germany
affect labor force adjustments in response to output shocks.  The
authors devoted some discussion to the possible influence of STC pro-
grams on this adjustment process, although this was not a primary
focus of their research.  Using aggregate data on hours worked and
hours on STC, they show that compensated short-time hours play an
important role in hours adjustments in Belgium and Germany. They did
not explicitly consider the layoff conversion issue for these countries.
Because aggregate data on hours worked were not available for France,
however, the authors studied only aggregate employment trends.  For
France, they constructed a hypothetical employment series “assuming
that layoffs were used in lieu of short time.”  This construction required
the authors to assume that layoffs and short-time could be substituted
on a one-for-one basis.  In common with most of the other literature on
European STC programs that we reviewed, the authors offer no empiri-
cal support for this assumption.  Hence, the issue of precisely how
widespread STC availability in Europe affects use of layoffs remains
open.
Studies Using Matching Methods
A third way of estimating the numbers of layoffs avoided because
of STC use is based on pairing firms that used STC with firms that did
not.  Difference-in-differences analysis is used to compare the FTE
workforce reductions of the STC firms and non-STC firms over time.
The critical assumption in this approach is that non-STC firms do not
differ systematically from STC firms; that is, unobserved differences
between the two groups are independent of treatment status.8
A growing set of economic literature has evaluated such non-
experimental evaluation (matching) methods (see, for example, Fried-
lander and Robins 1995; LaLonde 1986; and Fraker and Maynard
1987).  Selecting the pool of potential matches on the basis of similari-
ties in time, geographic area, and observation-specific characteristics is
one of the most difficult aspects of matching, and the appropriateness
of various criteria for restricting the pool has been debated.9  For exam-
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ple, researchers may consider limiting the pool of potential comparison
firms to those with certain observed levels of compensated unemploy-
ment, even though firms that used STC may have chosen not to lay off
workers.  Thus, researchers who use matching procedures to generate
comparison samples may have to make many decisions about what
constitutes a good match, without being able to draw on much eco-
nomic theory as a guideline. 
Matching procedures have several practical limitations.  First,
although matching attempts to control firm-specific differences at the
outset of the research design, the variables used for matching may not
adequately represent all factors affecting workforce adjustment strate-
gies.  The financial health of firms, their labor/management relations,
the demand for their products, and their production technologies, as
well as trends in these factors, may affect whether firms consider work-
force reductions.10  Data on these factors, however, are extremely hard
to obtain; most likely, the variables firms use to make their production
(and labor input demand) decisions are known only to the firms them-
selves.   Second, the treatment variable in matching studies must be
defined carefully.  Because firms change their STC status over time,
and enrollment can begin at any time, construction of this variable
requires focusing on a particular period (the study period) during
which the firm “uses” the program.  But that definition must invariably
involve some ambiguity when intensity of usage varies.  Finally,
because comparison firms are chosen to be as similar as possible  to
STC firms, they are also likely to have participated in the STC program
at times outside the study period.  Such prior participation may bias the
estimated treatment effects.
A 1986 study conducted by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.,
(MPR) matched STC firms in Arizona, California, and Oregon to non-
STC comparison firms on the basis of their size, UI tax rates, and Stan-
dard Industrial Classification (SIC) code (Kerachsky et al. 1986).  The
comparison firms in each state were chosen from among all firms in the
state not using STC during the study period.  Empirical estimates from
this study found widely varying layoff conversion rates across the three
states: California’s STC program did not appear to avert any layoffs;
Arizona’s STC program averted some layoffs, although total  unem-
ployment increased for firms using the program; and Oregon’s program
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appeared to have a  layoff conversion rate that approximated the 1.0
value assumed in many studies. 
Although a matching process was used, STC firms seemed to be in
greater economic distress because they had somewhat higher levels of
pre-STC compensated unemployment.  Although the researchers con-
trolled for this factor in most of their analysis, concerns about their
ability to control for pre-STC differences in layoff propensities
between the STC and comparison groups resulted in some criticism of
their findings.  These criticisms focused especially on the finding of no
STC impact on layoffs in California and on the possibility that the state
of California extracted the data incorrectly (Best 1988, pp. 75–76).
Still, the MPR study helped to emphasize the importance of measuring
rather than assuming the extent of layoff conversions that STC pro-
vides.
The recent Canadian evaluation used a very different methodologi-
cal approach to matching (Employment and Immigration Canada
1993).  In constructing the comparison group, the researchers chose a
random sample from administrative records of employees who had
been laid off in 1989 or 1990.  The firms from which the employees
were laid off were screened to ensure that the comparison firms chosen
had been in existence for at least two years and that they had “consid-
ered” laying off 20 percent or more of the full-time employees in a
business unit for nonseasonal reasons.11  Eligible comparison firms
could not have used the STC program in the past, and laid-off employ-
ees had to have been recalled within 26 weeks.  The analysis included a
total of 1,080 firms.
Because firms in the STC and comparison samples were not
matched according to specific characteristics (except the screening
requirement that comparison firms had to have considered laying off
employees), the two samples differed markedly along many of the
dimensions that the earlier MPR study used for matching, such as geo-
graphic location and industry.  Most notably, STC firms were only
about one-third the size of comparison firms, on average.  Possibly
because of these and other differences, many of the results from the
analysis of raw data were not supported when regression adjustment
techniques were used.  In contrast to the MPR study, STC firms in Can-
ada appeared to have been in less economic distress than were firms in
the comparison group because employees in these firms had signifi-
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cantly lower pre-STC compensated unemployment than comparison
firms’ employees. 
Despite using a comparison group for some parts of the analyses,
the Canadian evaluation did not directly compare layoffs or total com-
pensated unemployment for STC and comparison firms.12  To deter-
mine the number of layoffs averted because of STC, the ratio of STC
participants to plan-reported hypothetical layoffs was calculated for
1989 and 1990.  Because the firms included had 177,800 employees
using STC during these years, and the firms reported that STC averted
67,500 layoffs, the overall ratio was set at 2.6, although for some simu-
lations the 1990 rate of 2.31 was used instead.  These figures, together
with information from the comparison sample, provided the basic input
into the Canadian evaluation’s estimates of UI costs.  
Overall, the Canadian evaluation found that STC cost the UI sys-
tem approximately 35 percent more than an equivalent layoff alterna-
tive would have.13,14  The researchers stated that the differences
probably resulted primarily because 1) 29 percent of participating
employees were laid off after their period of STC collection; 2) STC
participation does not require the two-week waiting period, while regu-
lar UI does; 3) STC recipients were eligible for higher weekly benefit
amounts than laid-off employees; and 4) UI is not collected by all eligi-
ble laid-off employees. 
In summary, the Canadian study represents a hybrid in terms of the
methodology used to measure the layoff conversion rate.  The basic
conversion rate used was primarily self-reported, but many adjustments
were made to this rate with information from the study’s relatively
imperfectly matched control sample.  It is interesting that the study
yielded cost comparisons that are similar to those reported in the Best
and MPR studies.
RESULTS FROM THE BPA/MPR STUDY
Our recently completed study of the STC program in the United
States sheds additional light on the layoff conversion question,
although it fails to provide a convincing numerical estimate of this
parameter (Berkeley Planning Associates and Mathematica Policy
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Research, Inc. 1997).  As part of that project, we collected administra-
tive data from a relatively large sample of firms that used STC during
1992 in five states (California, Florida, Kansas, New York, and Wash-
ington).15  A comparison sample of equal size was also selected from
these states, with firms being matched to the STC firms using three
variables: firm size, three-digit industry, and UI tax rate.  Because of
the large number of non-STC firms in the states, we were able to match
quite closely along these dimensions.  Table 2 provides some quantita-
tive measures of these matches.  In general, the availability of a very
large universe of firms that did not use STC made it possible to achieve
a comparison sample that was virtually identical to the STC sample as
measured by the available data.   Still, as for all nonrandom evaluation
methodologies, we were concerned that STC participants may have
differed from nonparticipants along unmeasured dimensions—a con-
cern that proved to be of crucial significance in the analysis of the data
we collected.
Table 3 summarizes our data on regular UI and STC benefits
charged to firms during the three years 1991, 1992, and 1993.  To con-
trol for the large variation in firms’ sizes in our sample, these data have
been normalized by firms’ total 1991 “full-time-equivalent payrolls”
and then stated as a percent. Hence,  a total normalized charges of 1.00
means that the firms’ workers collected total chargeable benefits that
amounted to 1 percent of the total 1991 payroll.16
Three general conclusions are immediately apparent from the
table.  First, although overall charges to the UI system varied among
the three years, they were substantial in all three years, being some-
what larger in 1992 than in either 1991 or 1993.  Second, regular UI
was the predominate form of charges incurred.  That finding was, of
course, expected for firms in the comparison sample who, by defini-
tion, had no STC charges in 1992.  The findings for firms in the STC
sample are important, however.  They show that, in 1992, between 62
and 78 percent of all UI system charges were for regular benefits; that
is, despite their participation in the STC program, firms in 1992 appear
to have used layoffs as their primary workforce reduction strategy.
Thus, models that assume that firms follow an “either/or” approach to
such strategies clearly are inappropriate.
Finally, and most important, the values in Table 3 suggests the pos-
sible difficulties in relying on a comparison methodology for address-
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Match Quality
Match characteristic Californiaa Floridab Kansas New Yorkc Washingtond
Correlation between number of employees in 
matched firms
0.98 0.84 0.70 0.9 0.79
Correlation between tax rates in matched firms 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98
Number (percentage) of matches at the three-digit 























Number of matched pairs of firms 507 212 102 505 374
SOURCE State administrative records.
a The 507 firms in California were selected from among 5,143 firms with STC plans in 1992 using sampling stratified by the number of
employees and one-digit SIC code.  There are 100 matches in California that are excluded from this table since the STC and comparison
firms did not have complete information upon which a match could be made; that is, they were missing information on the number of
employees or the tax rate.
b There are eight matches in Florida excluded from this table since the STC and comparison firms did not have complete information
upon which a match could be made; that is, they were missing information on the number of employees or the tax rate.
c The 505 firms in New York were selected from among 737 firms with STC plans in 1992 using sampling stratified by the number of
employees and one-digit SIC code.  Only firms with at least five employees are eligible for participation in STC; comparison firms with
fewer than five employees, therefore, were excluded from the pool of potential comparison employers.
d There are nine matches in Washington excluded from this table since the STC and comparison firms did not have complete information
upon which a match could be made; that is, they were missing information on the number of employees or the tax rate.
306Table 3 Average Compensated Unemployment Charges, STC and Non-STC Firmsa,b
California Florida Kansas New York Washington
Characteristics STC Non-STC STC Non-STC STC Non-STC STC Non-STC STC Non-STC
1991
Normalized UI charges 0.871 0.791 1.426 1.284 0.915 0.762 1.335 1.501 3.543 3.470
Normalized STC 
charges
0.277 0.007*** 0.359 0.036*** 0.343 0.027*** 0.400 0.009*** 0.368 0.039***
Normalized total 
charges
1.149 0.798** 1.785 1.320** 1.258 0.788*** 1.735 1.510* 3.911 3.508
Percentage of total 
charges that are 
UI charges
79.424 98.531 84.060 98.773 77.536 98.387 71.393 99.433 90.275 98.519
1992
Normalized UI charges 0.936 0.964 1.825 1.153*** 1.681 1.206** 2.339 2.297 3.695 3.907
Normalized STC 
charges
0.561 0.000*** 0.847 0.000*** 0.759 0.000*** 0.878 0.000*** 1.022 0.000***
Normalized total 
charges
1.497 0.965*** 2.672 1.153*** 2.440 1.206*** 3.217 2.297*** 4.717 3.907***
Percentage of total 
charges that are 
UI charges
63.304 100.034c 62.078 100.000 69.030 100.000 65.146 100.000 78.456 100.000
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1993
Normalized UI charges 0.788 1.009*** 0.935 1.088 1.366 1.137 1.783 1.810 3.633 4.298*
Normalized STC 
charges
0.331 0.131*** 0.181 0.021*** 0.258 0.040*** 0.639 0.016*** 0.893 0.084***
Normalized total 
charges
1.120 1.140 1.116 1.108 1.624 1.177* 2.421 1.826*** 4.359 4.383
Percentage of total 
charges  that are 
UI charges
74.999 92.423 79.442 99.564 85.169 98.894 69.354 98.438 81.856 97.039
Sample size 431 721 191 231 90 106 441 559 314 378
SOURCE: State administrative records.
a * = Significantly different from STC firms at the 10% level, two-tailed test.
** = Significantly different from STC firms at the 5% level, two-tailed test.
*** = Significantly different from STC firms at the 1% level, two-tailed test.
b Samples restricted to firms in business throughout 1991 and 1992.  Because sample sizes vary slightly per charges measured, and
because of rounding, the sum of normalized UI charges and normalized STC charges in a year may not equal normalized total charges in
a year.  All charges variables are normalized by an approximation of payroll at full employment in 1991.  See text for further details.
c Firms occasionally have negative STC charges for a year.  In these instances, the percentage of total charges that are UI charges may
appear greater than 100%.
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ing the layoff conversion question.  In two of the states (Florida and
Kansas), mean UI charges in 1992 were significantly larger in STC
firms than in comparison firms.  Because no current theory suggests
that layoffs should be greater in otherwise similar firms that use STC,
the most likely explanation of this result is that STC and comparison
firms differ along dimensions that were not adequately controlled for in
the matching process—for example, those firms which opt to use STC
may have faced systematically worse economic prospects than did sim-
ilar firms in the comparison group.  Further support for this supposition
is reflected in the figures for total charges in 1992, which were signifi-
cantly larger for STC firms than for comparison firms in all of the
states by amounts ranging from 0.53 percent of total payroll (Califor-
nia) to 1.52 percent (Florida).
 We examined a number of statistical procedures for controlling for
these unmeasured differences between the STC and comparison firms
in models that seek to estimate the effect of STC on layoffs.  For ease
of comparison we present a variety of results for one simple specifica-
tion:
(1) Yt = α + βXt + γSTC + δYt–1 + ut ,
where Y is our measure of layoffs (normalized UI charges), X is a set of
individual firm characteristics,  STC is a dummy variable representing
participation in the STC program, u is a random error term, and the
lagged value of Y is included as a proxy for the general economic
health of the firm in the previous year.17,18  This specification was cho-
sen both for its overall simplicity and because it was believed that esti-
mates of γ, if they were unbiased, would permit a direct measure of
what we have called the “layoff conversion rate.”19
Table 4 reports results for four alternative approaches to the esti-
mation of γ.  The first specification used all observations in the sample
for which we had complete data.  As is immediately apparent, these
estimates take on values that cannot reasonably be interpreted in the
layoff conversion context.  In three of the states, γ is estimated to be
positive; in the other two, its value is very close to zero.  One interpre-
tation of such estimates is that they arise through selectivity bias—that
is, unmeasurable characteristics that differ systematically between STC
participants and firms in the comparison group cause estimates of γ to
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be biased in a positive direction.  However, the first specification does
control for  some variables that might plausibly serve as proxies for the
firms’ economic health, such as their UI tax rates  or their UI charges in
the prior year.  Hence, such selectivity must be based on current eco-
nomic factors that are not adequately controlled for by these variables. 
Because we did not have extensive information on other potential
control variables, we employed a variety of sample restrictions to
determine whether the suspected biases in specification (1) might be
mitigated.20  Our first approach focused on a possible asymmetry in the
Table 4 Estimated Effect of STC Participation on Normalized UI 
Charges in 1992 under Alternative Specificationsa




STC dummy –0.094 0.554*** 0.487** 0.223 –0.075
Sample size 1,152 421 196 1,000 692
(2) Omit zero UI 
charges
STC dummy –0.301*** 0.279 0.363 –0.101 –0.670**
Sample size 993 375 183 907 631
(3) Include zero STC 
charges
STC dummy –0.203 0.387** 0.546* 0.322* –0.110
Sample size 1,152 416 194 1,000 692
(4) Matched pairs
STC dummy –0.073 0.574*** 0.487* 0.233 –0.306
Sample size 502 336 132 814 444
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor Evaluation of Short-Time Compensation Pro-
grams.  Administrative data.
a *Significantly different from zero at the 0.10 level, two-tailed test.
**Significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level, two-tailed test.
***Significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level, two-tailed test.
b All regressions contained an identical set of control variables for firm size and its
square, UI tax rate, industry, and normalized UI and STC charges in 1991.
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treatment definition.  The STC treatment variable requires that some
STC benefits were paid to a firm’s workers in 1992, but no similar
requirement was imposed for the comparison firms.21  As an attempt to
control for this asymmetry, we omitted from the comparison group all
firms without UI charges in 1992.  Results for this omission are shown
in Table 4, as specification (2).  Although this approach is admittedly
ad hoc and runs the danger of incorporating biases of its own (an STC
firm might not have made any layoffs in the absence of the program,
and that decision would not be represented in such a sample), it did
have a substantial effect on the estimates of γ.  Both Kansas and Florida
samples continued to exhibit (insignificantly) positive estimates, but
estimates for the other three states were negative.  In California and
Washington, they were significantly different from zero.22  These
results clearly implied that selectivity is biasing parameter estimates in
the full sample, but we had little confidence that our sample redefini-
tion corrected for those biases in any systematic way.
Our final two specifications yielded similar ambiguous results.  For
specification (3), we redefined our STC variable to indicate only the fil-
ing of plans in 1992—it was not necessary for the firm to have experi-
enced any benefit charges under the program.  The rationale here was
the converse of that employed for specification (2)—firms filing for
STC were obviously aware of the program, but this specification
required that neither STC firms nor comparison firms had actually
incurred any charges in 1992.  Again, however,  this procedure yielded
several significant positive estimates of γ.  Finally, in specification (4),
we returned to our original STC indicator variable but required that
only pairs of STC firms and comparison firms enter the sample
together.  That procedure was intended to ensure that sample attrition
because of insufficient data was not influencing our results.23  Again,
many of the estimates for γ were implausibly positive.
Our statistical examination of the layoff conversion issue therefore
reached two primary conclusions.  First, firms that use STC also make
extensive use of layoffs.  Even though participation in the STC pro-
gram may offer significant advantages to these firms, they still appear
to rely on compensated reductions in hours for much less than half of
their total workforce adjustments.  Further analysis of this outcome
confirmed that STC use often accompanied widespread, “massive” lay-
offs (see Berkeley Planning Associates and Mathematica Policy
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Research 1997, Chapter 6).  Thus, it seems clear that modeling of the
impact of STC-type programs on labor demand over the business cycle
must take into account the full complexities of firms’ actual workforce
reduction strategies.  Considerably more empirical work is required if
we are to have reliable estimates of layoff conversion rates from STC
use in various circumstances.
Our second primary conclusion is that adoption of a comparison
methodology for the measurement of layoff conversions may be inade-
quate for obtaining unbiased estimates.  Selectivity effects in program
participation, at least for the low levels of participation experienced in
the United States, pose major, perhaps insurmountable, problems in
statistical inference.  In our experimentation with alternative specifica-
tions, we obtained a wide variety of layoff conversion rate estimates,
many of which seemed implausible on theoretical grounds.  Indeed,
our results suggest that the variation in earlier estimates of layoff con-
version rates using matching methodologies (Kerachsky et al. 1986)
may also be in part explained by selectivity biases.  Further progress on
estimation of this parameter may well require the development of alter-
native statistical approaches.
CONCLUSIONS
In theory, the availability of STC benefits in addition to benefits
provided through regular unemployment compensation should affect
how firms make cyclical workforce adjustments.  Understanding the
quantitative magnitude of these effects is an important component in
any evaluation of  a program’s overall desirability.  Given the centrality
of this issue, we find it surprising that relatively little attention has been
paid to the specification of a clear model for estimating these effects.
In our view, estimation of this type of model should be in the forefront
of economic research on STC programs.
Our review of the empirical literature on STC suggests that how
program availability affects firms’ workforce dynamics is far from
clear.  Consistent with other evaluations of their type, studies based on
self-reporting have produced widely varying estimates, some of which
are implausible.  Many other studies merely assume the size of an
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effect that should, in principle, be estimated.  Matching methodologies
seemed to offer the best promise of obtaining estimates of the effect of
STC from microdata.  Previous experiences with that methodology in
other contexts, however, suggest that its greatest drawback is the lack
of assurance that STC users and nonusers face similar economic pros-
pects despite major efforts to assure that the firms are closely matched
on measurable variables.  This possibility was confirmed by our experi-
ences in trying to model the impact of firm use of STC in the United
States during the 1992 recession, for which we obtained a wide variety
of layoff conversion rate estimates.  Hence, the suitability of other
research designs (such as innovative uses of aggregate data, random-
assignment experiments, or carefully designed case studies) needs to
be considered before attempting any overall assessment of the general
desirability of STC-type programs.
Notes
The first three sections of this chapter were presented at the Conference on Changes in
Working Time in Canada and the United States, sponsored by the Canadian Employ-
ment Research Forum in cooperation with Human Resources Development Canada,
Statistics Canada, and the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Ottawa.
This article has been funded at least in part with Federal funds from the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, Employment and Training Administration under Prime Contract num-
ber K-4722-4-00-80-30 to Berkeley Planning Associates.  The content of this
publication does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Department of
Labor or Berkeley Planning Associates nor does mention of trade names, commercial
products, or organizations imply endorsement by the U.S. Government.
1. Utilization rates for STC have been low under both programs, however.  UI pro-
grams in the United States also have provisions for the payment of partial bene-
fits, but these benefits are generally unavailable to workers suffering relatively
modest workweek reductions.
2. Studies of the increase in short-time work during recessions provide additional
support for the possibility that total compensation might increase when STC
becomes available.
3. In principle, one might want to measure changes in total hours and employment in
response to STC use, not simply unemployed hours that are compensated.  But the
data requirements for a more complete measurement at the level of the firm are
quite onerous, and no researcher has attempted such an evaluation.  Rather, the
existing research has focused on more readily measured compensated hours, usu-
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ally by drawing data from administrative sources.  Although use of the compen-
sated data sheds light on a number of important policy questions (such as the
effect of STC adoption on overall expenditures under the UI system), the extent to
which these data accurately reflect changes in total hours and employment is not
known.
4. For summaries of many of the other issues that have been addressed in the STC
research, see Best (1988) or Cook et al. (1995).
5. A firm may choose not to use its approved plan.  State agencies that approve plans
do not typically monitor whether plans are used and what happens if they are not
used.
6. Other assumptions pertain to the UI take-up rate of STC participants, the hazard
rate to reemployment for laid-off employees, the wages and benefit levels of STC
participants, and the costs of processing STC claims.  The estimate assumes firms
operate at the average values of workweek reductions, STC durations, and post-
STC layoffs.
7. In some cases, effects of STC on aggregate fluctuations make no use of the STC
data and therefore need no assumption about layoff conversions.  For example,
Van Audenrode (1994) finds that total hours exhibit much greater flexibility in
European countries with generous STC systems (Belgium, Italy, and Sweden)
than in countries with only modest levels of compensation (France and Germany).
Although this finding does not provide a direct estimate of the extent to which
STC use deters layoffs, it suggests that the trade-off may be significant in certain
situations.
8. Of course, the reason firms choose not to use STC is of critical importance.  Firms
that were not aware of STC might be more suitable matches than firms that knew
about it and chose not to use it.
9. Economic or operational criteria, such as legislative restrictions on firm character-
istics that limit eligibility for STC, may suggest the need to exclude certain firms.
In addition, there may be no credible matches for a particular firm (see, for exam-
ple, Kerachsky et al. 1986; and Schiff 1986).
10. Even if additional data were available for matching, the matching procedure is
computationally burdensome and extremely slow.
11. The authors made no attempt to reweight the sample to adjust for the higher prob-
ability of sampling large firms.
12. The analysis on pp. 148–155 indicates that STC claimants collected benefits for
fewer weeks than UI claimants, but it appears that adjustments were not made to
account for the increased number of claimants under an STC program.  Further-
more, compensation under STC was only for the workweek reduction and not for
the full weekly benefit amount.
13. Canada’s UI system is not experience rated, so higher compensated unemploy-
ment charges are not charged to a firm.  Because the U.S. system is experience
rated, albeit imperfectly and with a lag, firms with higher charges typically bear
responsibility for them. Hence, computations of the U.S. program’s “cost” to the
UI system must, of necessity, be more complex.
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14. For firms, the evaluation’s reported favorable benefit–cost estimates for STC com-
pared to layoffs resulted largely from the significant savings derived from reduced
training and hiring costs.  For society, the favorable estimates resulted largely
from the much lower stress-related costs of STC compared to layoffs.  These val-
ues were calculated on a per-layoff equivalent basis using the self-reported figures
described earlier.
15. Our definition of having “used” STC was that some benefits were paid to the
firm’s workers during 1992 under this program.  Implementing this definition
posed some difficulties because the only information available was on which firms
had filed STC plans at the time of sample selection.  Hence, we selected our STC
sample on the basis of having filed a plan in 1992, although (as discussed later)
we primarily used a definition stressing actual use in most of our analysis.
16. 1991 full-time-equivalent payrolls were estimated by adding total wages paid dur-
ing 1991 to an estimate of wages that would have been paid to the firms’ workers
who collected UI or STC during 1991 if these workers had instead been fully
employed during these periods.
17. The vector X includes firm size and its square, dummy variables for one-digit SIC
industry, and a measure of the 1991 UI tax rate.
18. Prior year normalized STC charges were also included in all regressions as  a fur-
ther control on the firm’s health in 1991.
19. Specifically, the average layoff conversion rate can be estimated as γ/k, where k
represents mean normalized STC charges during 1992.  In this specification, the
layoff conversion rate would be in terms of dollars—STC dollars substituting for
UI dollars.  We obtained substantially similar results from estimates of Y (and γ)
in terms of hours—perhaps a more natural, if less accurately measured, conver-
sion concept.
20. We also experimented with a number of statistical methods for controlling for
sample selectivity, but these were largely unsuccessful because of our inability to
develop clear ways of identifying the selectivity equation given the limited set of
control variables we had and the fact that firms in the sample had been matched on
these variables.
21. This asymmetry was also pointed out in connection with the earlier MPR study
(Morand 1990).
22. The point estimates for California and Washington imply layoff conversion rates
of –0.55 and –0.66, respectively.
23. To ensure the integrity of the matching, pairs in which a comparison firm experi-
enced STC charges (because of a plan filed prior to 1992) were also omitted from
the sample in some specifications.  We also used this sample to implement a
“paired” regression analysis, but this did not substantially change the results.
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